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University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA

According to the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the earliest landmark case decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States occurred in 1803—
Marbury v. Madison.1 In fact, when discussing the
casebooks through which students are introduced to
constitutional law, Carlton Larson refers to the period
between the ratification of the Constitution and the
Marbury decision being depicted as “a vast wasteland in
which no constitutional interpretation of any significance
took place.”2 The decision of the Court and the opinion of
Chief Justice John Marshall granted federal courts the
right and duty to declare executive and legislative actions
as unconstitutional, a concept modernly referred to as
judicial review.3 Judicial review was the first critical
precedent set by the Supreme Court as it expanded the
power of federal courts while checking the powers of the
executive and legislative branches, serving as a point of
reference in numerous landmark cases to follow.4 While
many consider the constitutional history preceding
Marbury to lack significant rulings, this notion disregards
one important legal decision; this essay will explain the
significance of this omission.
However, Larson’s statement without context was simply
incorrect; the history of the court system in the United
States began long before the ratification of the
Constitution, and the era between ratification and the
Marbury decision served as the official beginning of the
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federal judicial system. Preceding the establishment of the
judicial branch of the United States government by the
Constitution, the colonial courts consisted of Justice of the
Peace courts, which handled more trivial disputes, and the
quarter session courts. The quarter session courts had
juries of which the members must have a stake in
property.5 These local courts settled disputes on the basis
of English Common Law and applied it in their
deliberations.
The United States Supreme Court was established with the
ratification of the Constitution in 1788; Article III granted
the Court jurisdiction over all laws which questioned
constitutionality.6 The United States Congress passed the
Judiciary Act of 1789, establishing the highest court in
which George Washington nominated five justices to serve
on the bench until death or retirement—Associate Justices
John Rutledge, William Cushing, John Blair, James
Wilson, and Robert Harrison alongside Chief Justice John
Jay. The United States Senate confirmed all six justices.7
In 1791, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
first decision in the case West v. Barnes, in which the bench
strictly interpreted procedural filing requirements
mandated by statute.8 In Georgia v. Brailsford (1792), the
Court ruled that a state may sue in federal court to enjoin
payment of a judgment on foreign debt until it can be
ascertained to whom the money
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belongs.9 Although these cases served as the first
decisions of the highest Court, the first case to thoroughly
deliberate an issue of constitutionality faced decision in
1793.10
A decade prior to the decision of the Marbury case, and
prior to a time of any Supreme Court precedent, the Court
had reached a decision not only significant to the decision
of the Marshall Court in 1803, but also foundational. This
case, Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), first questioned
whether state governments could be sued in federal court
and raised a discussion of defining sovereignty as it relates
to the states.11 In Chisholm, the Jay Court decided that the
federal courts held the affirmative power to hear disputes
between private citizens and the states through Article III,
Section II of the Constitution—an early glimpse of this
concept of judicial review in the Supreme Court. 12 In
addition to its introduction of a crucial Supreme Court
precedent, the decision in Chisholm caused such
controversy that it resulted in the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment—the first individual addition to the
Constitution following the Bill of Rights. 13 Through its
impact on future case law and the definition of state
sovereignty, the 1793 Supreme Court case Chisholm v.
Georgia served as the first landmark Supreme Court case
and proved foundational to the Marbury case. The origins
of the Chisholm case trace back to October 1777, when the
Executive Council of Georgia authorized Thomas Stone
and Edward Davies, both of Savannah, to purchase goods
from a merchant of Charleston, South Carolina, Robert
Farquhar.14 The state of Georgia paid the men in
continental loan office certificates for the purpose of
compensating Farquhar. Contracted in Savannah, the
exchange provided American troops quartered near the
city with a considerable sum of supplies, including cloth,
silk, blankets, and coats in return for a payment of
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$169,613.33 to be made by December 1 of that year.15
According to the Chisholm case file, Farquhar delivered the
supplies on November 3 and requested payment on December
2, but Stone and Davies refused him.16
Robert Farquhar died in January 1784, having failed to
acquire compensation for the supplies he had sold, leaving his
inheritance to his ten year old daughter Elizabeth. 17 The
executor of Farquhar’s will, Alexander Chisholm, sued in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Georgia against
the state following a failed petition to settle the claim, which
asked for payment and damages; the Georgia House of
Representatives voted the suit down in December 1789.18
Georgia Governor Edward Telfair responded to the petition by
referring to the state as “a free, sovereign and independent
State, and that the said State of Georgia cannot be drawn or
compelled… to answer, against the will of the said State of
Georgia, before any Justices of the federal Circuit Court for
the District of Georgia or before any Justices of any Court of
Law or Equity whatsoever.”19
Telfair’s definition of Georgia as a sovereign body aligned with
a point made by Alexander Hamilton in 1788— “It is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent.”20 From the perspective of
Telfair—and the logic of Hamilton—the state could not be
obligated to appear in court if, as a sovereign body, it did not
agree to do so.
This idea of the consent of states to be sued was key to Justice
James Iredell’s decision while presiding over the Circuit Court
case at Augusta, Farquhar v. Georgia. Iredell shared the
opinion with Nathaniel Pendleton of the United States
District Court of Georgia—also presiding over the case—that
Georgia could not be sued by a citizen of another state, in this
case Alexander Chisholm was from South Carolina, in the
Circuit Court.21 Following another failed attempt to collect
damages and payment on behalf of Robert Farquhar,
Chisholm presented a petition to the United States Supreme
Court.
14 Doyle
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The Supreme Court of the United States served a
summons to the state of Georgia commanding it to appear
on February 8, 1792; copies of this summons were sent on
July 11 for the District of Georgia, Governor Telfair, and
the Attorney General of the state, Thomas P. Carnes. 22 As
the Court convened to hear the case, now listed as
Chisholm v. Georgia, in August of 1792, Georgia was not
represented. The Court postponed the case until February
1793.
During the session on February 4, the Court agreed to
hear Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United
States acting for the plaintiff, present his arguments,
which lasted roughly two and a half hours.23 Randolph
asserted that the Court had authority under the Judiciary
Act of 1789 to proceed with a lawsuit against the state of
Georgia.24 Once again, Georgia faced no representation in
the case; however, the Court considered the suit “of
considerable importance” and issued another invitation
to present attorneys to make a statement if they desired,
but none accepted.25
From February 5 to February 18, the Supreme Court
deliberated the Chisholm case.26 Justice James Wilson
characterized the fundamental nature of the issue the case
presents, stating in his opinion,
This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the
parties to it is a State; certainly respectable,
claiming to be sovereign. The question to be
determined is, whether this State, so respectable,
and whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States? This question, important in itself, will
depend on others, more important still, and may,
perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less
radical than this—do the people of the United States
form a nation?27
The last clause of Wilson’s statement raised a crucial
question relating to the nature of the Union.
In response, Jay first recognized that although “thirteen
sovereignties were considered as emerged from the
principles of the Revolution,” in reference to the states,
that “the sovereignty devolved on the people.”—thus
introducing that sovereignty lies in the people, not in
individual states.28

This concept can be described as imperium in imperio, or
a sovereign inside of another sovereign; in other words, if
the people are sovereign in this republican Union, they
cannot form a body, such as a state, that is also
sovereign.29 Additionally, Wilson argued that if the
Framers of the Constitution built the law of the republic
on the consent of the governed, sovereignty can only rest
in the individual people whom of which are asked to obey
the law.30 He concluded, “As to the purposes of the Union,
therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.”31
Chief Justice Jay reaffirmed this location of sovereignty in
the individual person, contending a “great and glorious
principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country,
and consequently that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns
cannot be degraded by appearing with each other in their
own Courts to have their controversies determined.”32 Jay
referred to the extension of the judiciary power of the
United States to aforementioned controversies as "wise,"
“honest,” and “useful.”33
In his opinion, Jay delivered a line critical not just to the
decision of the Chisholm case, but also to future
deliberations: “While all the states were bound to protect
each other, and the citizens of each, it was highly proper
and reasonable, that they should be in a capacity, not only
to cause justice to be done to each, and the citizens of
each; but also to cause justice to be done by each.”34 In
this explanation, Jay claimed the national judiciary
should be instituted by and be responsible to the whole
nation; Jay’s reference to the United States as a nation
answered the overarching issue in question by Wilson. 35
In his conclusion, Chief Justice Jay asserted that through
Article III, Section II of the Constitution, it was proper for
the national judiciary to ensure the states do justice for
those with whom disputes arose.36 This idea embodied the
origin of the discussion of protecting the minority opinion
in the federal courts through judicial review, the central
thesis to John Marshall’s argument in Marbury v.
Madison.37

29 Randy E. Barnett. “The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
Sovereignty.” Virginia Law Review, 2007. 1732.

21 Mathis, 23.
22 Ibid., 24.

30 Ibid., 1733.
31 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 457.
32 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 479.

23 Ibid., 26.

33 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 480.

24 John J. Gibbons. “The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation.” Columbia Law Review 83, 1983. 1923-24.

34 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 474.

25 Mathis, 24.
26 Ibid., 25.
27 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 453.
28 Ibid., 454.

35 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 465.
36 Gibbons, 1925-26.
37 Kemp Plummer Yarborough. “Chisholm v. Georgia: A Study of the Minority
Opinion.” Columbia University, 1963.
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such a power, a new law is necessary for the purpose, since
no part of the existing law applies, this alone is sufficient to
justify my determination in the present case.”46 To Iredell,
his dissent stood on the basis that the Court did not hold the
jurisdiction to deliberate the case, and certainly not to make
a decision in Chisholm.

Jay also advocated for a principle described as “judicial
symmetry,” which reasons that if a state can sue an
individual, then an individual should be able to sue a
state.38 In response to this stance, Attorney General
Randolph expressed his frustration to James Madison,
writing in August 1792, “He is clear, too, in the expression
of his ideas, but that they do not abound on legal subjects
has been proven to my conviction; there was no method,
no legal principle, no system of reasoning!”39

Justice Iredell’s twenty-one-page opinion in the case
record contained only one paragraph relating to the
constitutional question being addressed in Chisholm—the
rest he filled with a detailed summary of English Common
Law on the issue.47 Iredell asserted that Common Law was
the only law common to all the states, and parts of the
common law of England relative to remedies against the
Crown could be applied to this subject, as these parts had
undergone no changes in the states.48 While the other
justices tended to structure their opinions based upon
constitutional reasoning, Wilson did acknowledge that
sovereign immunity was a part of Common Law and had
been in England since the reign of King Edward I in the
late thirteenth century.49

When delivering his opinion, Justice John Blair asserted
that he would only consider the wording of the
Constitution and nothing else; the issue that arose in this
situation was the lack of content in the Constitution
relating to sovereign immunity.40 As a result, his opinion
is brief, but Blair noted Article III, Section II, reasoning
that once a state “has agreed to be amenable to the judicial
power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given
up her right of sovereignty.”41
Like Chief Justice Jay, Justice William Cushing also
reasoned that if a state was entitled to justice in federal
court against a citizen of another state, then such citizens
should be entitled to justice against a state.42 Additionally,
Cushing defended the postulation that Article III, Section
II of the Constitution provided a necessary dispute
resolution between states and citizens of other states. 43

On February 19, 1793, the Supreme Court announced
their decision following the delivery of the justices’
opinions the day prior. The Court, in a four to one
decision, ordered: “…that the Plaintiff in this case do file
his declaration on or before the first day of March next.
Ordered, that certified copies of the said declaration be
served on the Governor and Attorney General of the State
of Georgia, on or before the first day of June next.

Justice James Iredell, who had presided over the case in
the circuit court, was still not convinced of the petitioner’s
standing. A major part of the Associate Justice’s opinion
was devoted to questioning whether the Supreme Court
even had jurisdiction to hear a breach of contract case
without express authorization by the Constitution or by
Congress.44 Iredell construed narrowly section 14 of the
Judiciary Act as an authorization of the “issuance of writs
known at common law or authorized by the defendant
state’s law”—conveying that the Court had no authority to
grant remedy against a state to a private plaintiff. 45

Ordered, that unless the said State shall either in due form
appear, or shew cause to the contrary in this Court, by the
first day of next Term, judgement by default shall be
entered against the State.”50
Therefore, through this decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the views of Alexander Hamilton and other key
Federalists that insisted a state could not, without
consent, be made a party defendant in federal court by a
citizen of another state.51 The people, from all parts of the
United States, met the Court’s decision with an
“immediate and strong”52 reaction;

Iredell justified his circumvention of direct construction
of the Constitution by stating, “My opinion being that
even if the Constitution would admit of the exercise of

William A. LaBach. “The Career of State Sovereign Under the United
States Constitution”. University of Kentucky Press, 2007. 19.
38

39 Ibid.,

21.

40 Ibid.,

24.

41 Chisholm
42 LaBach,
43 Ibid.,

v. Georgia, 2. Dall. 419 (1793), 452.

26.

26.

44
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46
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Significance.” The North Carolina Historical Review 8, 1931.
47

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), 437-45.
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Review 133, 1984.
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charter of our rights would, in a very little time, be entirely
construed away, and become at length so disfigured that its
founders would recollect very few of its original features.” 58
Moreover, Strasser argued that if the purpose of the
Eleventh Amendment was simply to overturn Chisholm, the
Amendment would no longer permit similar suits to be
heard and federal court, but also not alter any other section
of the Constitution.59

on the same day the Court issued its order, the House of
Representatives introduced a resolution for an
amendment to the Constitution, and the following day the
Senate introduced a similar resolution.53 These initial
resolutions themselves did not pass through their
respective chambers; however, the controversy over the
Chisholm decision did not simply dissolve, as on January
14, 1974, the United States Senate passed a new resolution
for a constitutional amendment, and on March 4 the
resolution passed in the House of Representatives. 54

After being ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the
states on February 7, 1795, the Eleventh Amendment had
been proposed and ratified in less than two years following
the Chisholm decision—an unusually short period of time
for the passage of an amendment to the Constitution.60
Despite its ratification in 1795, the Eleventh Amendment
was not proclaimed as part of the United States
Constitution by the President until John Adams in January
1798.61

The final wording of the Eleventh Amendment declared
that “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”55 According to historian
William A. LaBach, the wording of this amendment
“clearly conveyed a lack of confidence in the ability and/or
willingness of judges to correctly interpret the
Constitution,” claiming that the amendment failed to
resolve or clarify the underlying question of sovereign
immunity of the state.56

It was the haste at which the legislature and states ratified
the Eleventh Amendment that contributed to the
aforementioned stance that Chisholm v. Georgia was not to
be considered a landmark Supreme Court case; in result of
its being “overridden” by an amendment, the decision
itself, as well as its definition of sovereignty, are a “dead
letter,” as explained by law professor Randy Barnett. 62
However, Barnett pointed out that the question occupying
the Supreme Court in Chisholm of the nature of sovereignty
in the United States was its first major decision and ideal
in studying the decisions of cases deliberated by the
Marshall and Roger B. Taney Courts. In fact, he referred to
the cases of the Marshall Court without mention of
Chisholm as “out of context.”63

Over a decade following the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment, Justice Joseph P. Bradley explained that the
history of the amendment had never intended to extend
jurisdiction to such cases; he claimed that Chisholm
“created such a shock of surprise throughout the country
that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost
unanimously proposed and was in due course adopted by
the legislatures of the States. This amendment, expressing
the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country,
superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed
the decision of the Supreme Court.”57

Furthermore, Justice Bradley once again referred to the
significance of the Chisholm decision in the Hans case,
proclaiming, “The suability of a State without its consent
was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid
down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is
hardly necessary to be formally asserted. It was fully shown
by an exhaustive examination of the old law by Mr. Justice
Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia; and it has
been conceded in every case since, where the question has,
in any way, been presented, even in the cases which have
gone farthest away in sustaining suits against the officers
or agents of States.”64

However, in the 1809 Supreme Court case United States
v. Bright, Justice Bushrod Washington claimed the
wording of the Eleventh Amendment to be worthy of strict
interpretation, questioning, “Would we be justified by any
rule of law in admitting such an interpolation, even if a
reason could not be assigned for the omission of those
words in the amendment itself? I think not. In our various
struggles to get at the spirit and intention of the framers
of the constitution, I fear that this invariable

United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1236.
Mark Strasser. “Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, and
Sovereign Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation
Principles.” Florida State University Law Review 28, 2001. 618.
60 Orth, 256.
61 Mathis, 26.
62 Barnett, 1740.
63 Ibid., 1739.
64 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 16.
58

Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser, Feb, 22, 1793. Gazette of the
United States, Feb. 20, 1793.
53
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59
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Significance.” The North Carolina Historical Review 8, 1931.

Furthermore, Barnett argued that the decision in Chisholm
represented the “road not taken” with respect to
constitutional amendments—the idea that the case revealed
a piece of the Constitution found to be “inconvenient in
practice” and presented an opportunity to point out a
“regular mode,” discussed by Justice Cushing, for
amendment.65 In the 1996 Supreme Court case Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
articulated that “the people of the United States in their
sovereign capacity subsequently decided” against the
current interpretation of Article III, Section II of the
Constitution following the Chisholm decision and in favor
of the passage of the Eleventh Amendment.66
In summary, the Chisholm decision served as a critical and
foundational point in United States legal and constitutional
history as it questioned the nature of the Union, defined
sovereignty as it related to the states, introduced the origins
of judicial review in the federal judiciary, and affirmed the
people as sovereign through the push toward passing an
amendment to reverse the effects of the decision.
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